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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
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1. THE PROBLEM 
The thesis has been advanced that objectivity has historically been used to ex­
clude women from the university, and value freedom to exclude socialists from the 
university (Proctor, 1991). In fact, Georg Simmel argued that science and objectivity 
are defined so as to exclude women. Simmel felt : 
. . . that science itself is masculine, that objectivity and neutrality are 
attitudes of the male spirit, and that women tend to identify too much 
with their surroundings to allow them to develop an objective attitude 
toward the natural world (Proctor, 1991:116). 
Men are thus seen as objective, while women are seen as subjective with the more 
positive value being placed on the objective. 
Value neutrality can be used in the same way to distance sociology from socialism 
and from attempts to politicize social theory (Gouldner, 1970; Proctor, 1991). It is 
the "password" or "gentleman's promise that boats will not be rocked" (Gouldner, 
1970:66). Proctor (1991), in. his insightful analysis of German social science in the 
first decade of the twentieth century, argues that the concept first began to enter 
philosophical debate at a time when socialism was emerging in Europe. He writes 
that: 
Value-neutrality served two different, but related, functions. On the one 
hand, sociologists used value-neutrality as a tool to refute attempts on 
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the part of Marxists to politicize social theory. "Scientific socialism" 
becomes one of the most common targets of the charge of "non-neutral" 
or "biased" social science. Sociology was also declared neutral in order 
to avoid the charge that sociology was simply another word for socialism 
(Proctor, 1991:104). 
Whether or not one agrees with the particulars of the above arguments, the point 
can be made that modern life is dominated by an ideology of rational, objective, value-
free science, and that institutionalized science has used this ideology as a gatekeeping 
device to exclude undesirables. Those deemed nonrational or irrational, subjective, 
or value laden are devalued, and placed clearly outside the domain of science. Yet 
as Thomas Kuhn (1962) pointed out, such a dominant ideology only serves to blind 
one to the possibility of other points of view. 
As science became more institutionalized and more tied to government patron­
age, there arose the need to differentiate "good" science from "bad" science. Uni­
versities began to grant science degrees and to screen those aspiring to the status of 
scientist. Through the ages, this system has used the ideology of rational, value-free 
science in its screening process; for as Simmel points out: 
. . . systems of domination have always sought to clothe themselves 
in the guise of neutral and objective legality- so that power appears as 
justice, force as law (Proctor, 1991:117). 
Simmel's analysis seems appropriate, especially when applied to the concept of 
rationality. As will be further detailed in this volume, the concept of rationality 
has come to connote means-ends rationality to the exclusion of all other previously 
understood meanings. This allowed for the convenient discrimination between "good" 
and "bad" scientists. 
Weber, in his analysis of the concept of rationality delineates two different types . 
of rationality: value-rationality and means-ends rationality. In the modern world, as 
Weber predicted, rationality has come to connote means-ends rationality only. This, 
in part, stems from the transformation of value being defined in reference to God or 
nature, as it was in the ancient world, to value being defined as " value in the eyes of 
man: value in use, value in exchange" (Proctor, 1991:21). It is the purpose of these 
papers is to reclaim the broader meanings of "rationality" and to uncover the value 
orientations inherent in the concept of value-freedom. 
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2. THE IDEOLOGY 
Any discussion of modern science carries with it assumptions about the meaning 
of rationality and value freedom. These assumptions and their implications are rarely 
scrutinized by scientists as they go about their everyday research activities, yet are 
fundamental to the way they do science. 
Deep within Western philosophical tradition is an appreciation of the free 
and unhampered pursuit of knowledge, a freedom based on a distinction 
between the ideal of theory, on the one hand, and the pursuit of personal 
gain or social need, on the other (Proctor, 1991:5). 
This sets up the distinction between basic and applied science which has fueled debate 
over the role of science in society. One side sees science as an appropriate instru­
ment for the facilitation of social change, while the other feels science should be 
detached from the contamination of the world (Coleman, 1978). Both sides embrace 
the ideology of value-freedom without fully considering the hidden contradictions and 
dilemmas. 
Science is forced on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, there are 
calls for scientific freedom, born of fears for the survival of science in the 
face of political tyranny. On the other hand, there are calls for account­
ability in science, for sciences more in tune with practical human needs 
and desires. There is the sense that science is objective, that objectivity 
is an essential quality of science; yet there is also the growing sense that 
science serves specific social interests (Proctor, 1991:5). 
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Those who call for science to serve practical human needs must recognize the benefits 
and problems associated with doing research that is attractive to interest groups. The 
benefits are that interest groups will fund the research. The problems, at least from 
the standpoint of the ideology of value-freedom, are that those who pay will seek to 
control. Scholars who demand that science remain aloof from interest groups must 
see that that position itself is a value judgement, and must contend with diminished 
funding. 
As never before, it is important for social science to scrutinize the assumptions 
associated with the modern formulations of value freedom and rationality. In an age 
when the human gene can be manipulated and wars fought with computers, simple 
means-ends rationality and an ideology of value-freedom should be questioned as the 
organizing principles of scifence and society. The values inherent in the choices society 
makes must be unearthed. These papers seek to help the scholar recognize the value 
orientation inherent in modern science. 
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3. THE ANALYSIS 
The major portion of this work concerns the writings of Max Weber. This is 
in large part due to the attention Weber pays to rationality and value freedom in 
his writings, and to the centrality of Weber's role in the study of science and social 
science. It is also due to what the author feels are two misconception concerning 
Weber's treatment of these subjects. 
Weber is often considered a proponent of: (1) bureaucracy, and through it the (2) 
rationalization of modern life, and of (3) value freedom in science. While the latter 
is correct in a limited sense, the former two are false. Weber was quite pessimistic 
about the effect of bureaucracy and rationalization on modern life, as his writings 
on administrative violence attest. As will be discussed in detail in the first paper, 
Weber saw rational action as only a portion of human action. Of the four types 
of action defined by Weber (traditional, afFectual, wertrational, and zweckrational) 
only two types are rational (Runciman, 1978). Weber also understood that rational 
action itself could be broken down into four distinctly different parts depending upon 
whether the evaluation of the action is from the point of view of the actor or the 
observer. Weber felt that ethical difficulties arise when science fails to honor the 
distinction between value rational action and means-ends rational action. It is in this 
context that Weber discusses value-freedom. 
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Weber's stand on value freedom is also complex. It is discussed at length in 
the last two papers. In general, however, Weber felt that value freedom is an ideaî 
that the teacher should adhere to. He felt that teachers must avoid dressing their 
opinions in the guise of scientific fact. However, he was quick to point out that this 
is purely a value judgement (Weber, 1949). Weber also felt that scientists should 
attempt to eliminate value judgements from their work. Yet, he questioned whether 
this is truly possible. 
To approach the ideal of value freedom, both the researcher and the teacher 
must understand that values influence their work. Because of this, Weber saw value 
orientations themselves as an appropriate subject of study for the social scientist. 
Given his extensive writings on the subject and the popular misconceptions about 
his views, the author seems justified in writing yet another thesis on Max Weber. 
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4. THE PAPERS 
The three papers in this volume explore the transformation of the concepts of 
value freedom and rationality in social sciences as it applies to sociological theory and 
practice. The intent is to lay bare the implicit assumptions within these concepts so 
as to acquaint the modern social scientist with the dilemmas hidden there. 
The first paper: The Concept of Rationality in Social Theory: It's Origins in 
Comte, Weber, and Durkheim was co-authored with Drs. Woodman, and Hollinger. 
This paper was presented at the Midwest Sociological Society Meetings in Des Moines, 
Iowa in April of 1991 and was well received. It explores the various theoretical 
meanings of the concept of rationality and their implications for social science. 
Weber's concept of rationality centers on the idea of value orientation and calls 
into question our modern conception of science. This leads into the second paper: 
Setting the Record Straight: Weber on Value Freedom and Policy Analysis which was 
presented before the Midwest Sociological Society Meetings in Kansas City, Kansas in 
April 1992. This paper addresses the popular conception of Weber's stance on value 
freedom and its implications for policy analysis in light of Weber's actual writings 
on the subject. The basic conclusions drawn are that the social sciences hold a 
conveniently simplistic view of value freedom that is not consistent with Weber's 
writings, a view which allows us to overlook value laden behavior in the scientific 
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enterprise. 
The third paper, Scholars in the Iron Cage was co-authored with Drs. Woodman 
and Hollinger. This work deals with the implications of a one-dimensional view of 
rationality and the ideology of value freedom in the university. It was also presented 
to a session of the Midwest Sociological Society Meetings in April of 1992. 
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5. THE FORMAT 
This dissertation consists of three publishable papers written on a topic of in­
terest to sociology which are preceded by a general introduction and followed by a 
general summary. All three paper concepts were developed by the candidate. The 
Concept of Rationality in Social Theory: Its Origins in Comte, Weber, and Dur-
kheim and Scholars in the Iron Cage were both co-authored by the candidate and 
Drs. Woodman and Bollinger. The candidate was responsible for the portions on 
Weber, rationality, value freedom, and value blindness, as well as for editing and 
linking the contributions of the co-authors. Setting the Record Straight: Weber on 
Value Freedom and Policy Analysis was solely authored by the candidate. 
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PART I. 
THE CONCEPT OF RATIONALITY IN SOCIAL THEORY: ITS 
ORIGINS IN COMTE, WEBER, AND DURKHEIM 
13 
1. ABSTRACT 
The concept of rationality has gone through a number of changes during the 
course of human history, at one point or another having the meanings of: reasons 
given for an action, maximization of self-interest, reason as the discoverer and source 
of knowledge, reason as the source of all moral good, and reason as the mainspring 
of human history. These changes have resulted in confusions which have had a great 
impact upon the social sciences, for the obvious reason that human behavior and its 
motivations constitute the subject matter of the social sciences. Some of the far-
reaching effects of this problem can be seen in the writings of three prominent social 
theorists. In this paper we propose to examine the origins of the concept of rationality 
in the social sciences and conjecture as to the significance of new evolutions in its use 
and meanings. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
Although the concept of Rationality is at least as old as Aristotle, whose state­
ment "Man is a rational animal" gives the notion its canonical form in the West, it 
was not made thematic until the time of Machiavelli and Hobbes. Until then "Rea­
son" was the operative concept. Reason was basically a functionalist notion (i.e. each 
type of thing, including the human species, has its peculiar "function" or good, which 
required that type of being to tune into the forces of the cosmos in order to realize 
its good). Since human beings are essentially rational, finding the human good was 
necessary in order to live the truly human life. The notion of irrationality was only 
to be recognized in order to be set aside. The surd is not capable of being discussed; 
there is no form of the mud, as Plato puts it in the Parmenides. Modern theorists 
do the same by defining outside their theoretical purview as "irrational" all behavior 
they cannot explain. 
To be sure, the idea of giving reasons for behavior, in the form of causal or 
teleological explanations was common practice. Actions could be judged to be ra­
tional or irrational depending upon the reasons given and the ends aimed at. But 
"rationality" and "irrationality" as modern modes of acting and understanding did 
not arise until much later. It was only with the rise of modern individualism and the 
scientific revolution that these notions came to take center stage. 
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By way of dating this change, it can be noted that rationality as a maximizing 
principle is often linked to Hobbes. The rational egoism of Hobbes requires one to 
distinguish between rational and irrational ways of maximizing self-interest. When 
actions do not maximize utility functions (or serve the self- interests of the actor), 
the action (or at least the chosen means) is, by definition, irrational. When it does 
maximize self interest, the actor is said to be a rational agent. 
The development of the modern scientific method under the impetus of Galileo 
and Descartes generated the need for a procedure which guaranteed objective truth. 
This began the tendency to see reason as a method to obtain knowledge. Such 
procedures are rational since they allow objective truth to be discovered. Other 
methods, e.g., "subjective" methods, do not achieve, but rather block the quest for 
objective truth. 
Jumping forward to the present we see that modern philosophy makes new use of 
the concept of Reason in its view that "reason", not experience, is the ultimate source 
and justification of knowledge, and indeed is the source of a priori absolute knowledge. 
The mind, in this view, is essentially a computer, which can solve all problems through 
calculation, but only if it is purified of all irrational "subjective" elements, which in 
effect means everything except the raw data of experience that presses itself into the 
pure ego, together with the calculating power of pure reason/logic. 
The French Enlightenment developed a Utopian program for eliminating human 
misery, which was based upon the assumption that ignorance and superstition, e.g., 
religion and myth, are the sources of all misery. Knowledge, reason, and rationality 
would, Enlightenment thinkers asserted, eliminate misery and promote what Francis 
Bacon called "the relief of the human estate." In doing so, they added to the already 
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cumbersome baggage of the concept of reason as the source of moral rightness. The 
idea of a scientific civilization, first elaborated by Bacon, was to become the goal 
of the Enlightenment. Scientific knowledge about human behavior, in their view, 
must be used to transform all of society and human life into utopia. By a process 
of residual definition, all behavior not based upon scientific knowledge, or utilitarian 
calculation came to be defined as both irrational and morally bad. 
Hegel and the German Idealists were to temper this Enlightenment version of 
Positivism by invoking the ancient Platonic notion of Reason as comprehensive un­
derstanding, and subsuming the modern notion of rationality as scientific procedure 
and calculation under the category of Reason. In so doing, Hegel tried to over­
come the Enlightenment's one sided notions of rationality, reason and abstract moral 
universalism by infusing elements of romanticism into his wider notion of reason as 
comprehensive understanding of the world and its processes of development. But 
for Hegel reason could only comprehend the world after the fact; after the Owl of 
Minerva had painted its grey on grey. So reason had to become retrodictive; it 
could only comprehend what has already happened by understanding its own time 
in thought. This apparently left little role for prediction, planned social change, or 
radical criticism (the point at which Marx would later enter the picture). 
For Hegel, individuals were seen to act rationally, but they do so partly because 
the dialectics of human history demands that human actions serve the forces of reason 
that characterize human history. The cunning of reason, like Adam Smith's invisible 
hand, introduced the notion of the unintended consequences of intentional, ratio­
nal action, into the realm of human action and history. By the same token, social 
phenomena (what Hegel called "the realm of objective spirit," and what Durkheim 
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called "social facts" and laws) must be taken into account in order to understand 
human behavior. Said another way, Hegel introduced the organic model of society, 
which would result in functionalism and systems analysis, the dominant organizing 
principles of modern social science. 
Meanwhile, Auguste Comte, and later Saint Simon, would, in effect, combine the 
Baconian ideas of Enlightenment Positivism with Hegel's notion of reason, to create 
the idea of the Religion of Reason. These French Utopian thinkers (whom Marx 
criticized as "utopian socialists") envisioned a modern Gemeineschaft th&t would be 
created and sustained by the systematic study of human behavior and society. The 
"moral sciences", as Hume and Mill called them, were to serve progressive forces by 
transforming society into a rational and functional organic unity. Durkheim, who 
was a vociferous enemy of Hegel, was nevertheless influenced by these developments, 
as we will make clear later. 
Saint Simon's idea of a rational progressive society envisioned a top-down en­
lightened despotism of and by a knowledge elite. Such an idea was to pave the way 
for the 20th Century managerial elite, and of the ideology of a post-industrial society 
as described by writers such as Daniel Bell (1962). Such a view was not to take hold 
in the United States until the advent of the Progressivist Movement, and appeared 
in the writings of both Thorstein Veblen (1934) and Frederick W. Taylor (1911). 
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3. AUGUSTE COMTE 
Comte's vision of à rational organic society, which Durkheim was to develop most 
completely, takes its point of departure from a biological-organic model of society as 
well as an evolutionary view of human development. The so-called "Law of the Three 
Stages" asserts that science is more rational than myth and religion/philosophy, and 
hence it is science which is to provide the most rational way of dealing with all social 
and human problems. The organic analogy is, in effect, the first sociological excursion 
into structural-functionalism and into systems analysis. 
From this perspective, each "organ" of the social whole functions optimally so 
as to maximize the organic well being of the entity; thus it can be said to be rational. 
Comte's new "Religion of Humanity" was to make sociology and the Positive Laws it 
discovered the culmination and linch-pin of a new secular order. "Rationality" and 
"irrationality" were redefined with functional and social meanings. 
In Comte's view, in fact, either psychology is ultimately reduced to physiology 
(and thus constitutes a natural science) or the behavior of the individual must be 
explained in a social context. It is not clear that individual rationality can have any 
other meaning in Comte's system. 
Comte's optimism about the role of rationality in human society was criticized 
as naive by Marx. But it was Weber's analysis of modern society and the types 
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of rationality that finally sunders the Enlightenment view of society in two. In his 
writings Weber succeeded in severing utterly the connection between rational action 
and scientific progress. While this is not to say that Comte's vision is not still 
tremendously influential, many of those who accept Comte's vision fail to realize 
that his Positivism was infused from the ground up with Hegel's vision of social and 
human progress. Even Durkheim, not to mention other Positivists, could not (or at 
least did not) see this connection. 
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4. EMILE DURKHEIM 
Durkheim's theory of rationality is much less developed but in many ways has 
had a greater influence on sociology than Weber's. Durkheim follows the Enlighten­
ment faith in reason as the salvation of society. Durkheim even claims in his essay 
"Rules for the Distinction of Normal from Pathological" (Durkheim, 1982), that sci­
ence can guide the individual in the selection of higher ends. 
Durkheim's conception of reason refers to instrumental rationality: "(it) is not 
my reason nor yours; it is the impersonal human reason, only truly realized in science" 
(cited in Hearn, 1985). 
Indeed our main objective is to extend the scope of scientific rationalism 
to cover human behaviour by demonstrating that, in light of the past, it 
is capable of being reduced to relationships of cause and effect, which, 
by an operation no less rational, can then be transformed into rules of 
action for the future. What has been termed our positivism is merely a 
consequence of this rationalism (Durkheim, 1982:33). 
For Durkheim, man is basically an untempered bundle of desires and passions 
that must be harnessed by society if social order is to be maintained (Hearn, 1985). 
This harnessing of the nature of man is reason, and for Durkheim, reason has a social 
origin (Hawthorne, 1976). 
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The science of moral facts, ... is simply this: the application of human 
reason to the moral order, first of all to understand it, and finally to direct 
its changes. I am not concerned with 'the literal meaning of reason'. On 
the contrary, this methodical application of the reason has, as its principal 
task, our release from the suggestions of 'reason' thus understood, in order 
to allow the things themselves to speak; the things in this case being the 
present condition of moral opinion in its relation to the social reality which 
it should express . . . (Durkheim, 1953:66). 
Reason, then exists outside the individual in reality. Durkheim maintained that 
the individual's ability to reason and his moral sense are both social products and are 
part of the collective consciousness. Durkheim also claimed science is a social fact. 
I reply that society arrives at this fuller [collective] consciousness only by 
science; and science is not an individual; it is a social thing, pre-eminently 
impersonal (Durkheim, 1953:66). 
So far it would seem that Durkheim sees reason as some form of normative, 
moral, instrumental rationality. Durkheim's hopes for social order in modern society 
rests in the replacement of subjective sentiment with reason. 
The reason to which I make my appeal is reason applying itself .to a 
given matter in a methodical manner in order to understand the nature 
of past and present morality, and which draws from this theoretical study 
its practical consequences. Reason thus understood is simply science, the 
science of morality. My major concern is to free morality from sentimental 
subjectivism, which hinders its progress and is a form either of empiricism 
or mysticism, two closely linked ways of thinking (Durkheim, 1953:66-67). 
As science is a social fact and reason is science, then reason must also be a social 
fact. The control made possible by reason is a condition of freedom in modern society 
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(Hearn, 1985). Science, or better, the science of morality (sociology) is for Durkheim 
the instrument of individual adaptation and submission to society. 
One of the most direct of Durkheim's discussions of rationality occurs in a frag­
mentary collection published in 1924 under the title Sociologie et Philosophie. Dur­
kheim is responding to a "M. Darlu" who had apparently written to the author with 
an observation. Given that the original letter is lost, we can only deduce that Mon­
sieur Darlu wrote about the connection between individual reason and morality and 
how free from social constraints a person might be, for Durkheim deals with the 
question at length. Specifically, Durkheim (1953:65) argues that while the individual 
is free to rebel against society, particularly when the true nature of society is not 
reflected in the rules of behavior, the key is that. 
In the sphere of morality, as in the other spheres of nature, individual 
reason has no particular prestige as such. The only reason for which 
one can claim the right of intervention, and of rising above historical 
moral reality in order to reform it, is not my reason nor yours; it is the 
, impersonal human reason, only truly realized in science. 
He goes on to argue that as the natural and physical sciences permit the manipu­
lation of the material they study, the "science of moral facts" lets us control the study 
of morality in a dispassionate way. The goal of which "Has as its end," Durkheim 
(1953:65) adds, "not the substitution of an individual ideal for the collective, but the 
substitution of an equally collective ideal which expresses not a particular personal­
ity but the collective itself more clearly understood." The interesting methodological 
implication of this observation is seen in Durkheim's (1953:64) assertion that. 
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To science alone belongs the task of discovering the reality itself and of 
expressing it. It is on the reality, thus understood, that the scientist 
should base his judgements of future developments. 
Clearly, Durkheim either sees reality as either too elusive for individuals or in­
dividuals as insufficiently rational to apprehend it. In either case the intimation is 
that any method of research which fails to substitute scientifically derived data for 
individual perceptions of reality should be seen as suspect. In addressing his corre­
spondent, Durkheim (1953:66) responds to the charge that the individual morality is 
superior to that of society and that the moral individual would thus be more rational 
to rebel against society. 
If it is argued that this fuller and higher consciousness of itself is only 
expressed in and through an individual intellect, I reply that society ar­
rives at this fuller consciousness only by science; and science is not an 
individual; it is a social thing, pre-eminently impersonal. 
While the present century has provided us with many examples of collectively 
derived consciousness which are unscientific and even hostile to Western rationality, 
it is clear that for Durkheim there is only one rationality and that he equates it with 
the positivist model of scientific knowledge (Hawthorne, 1976), for Durkheim gave the 
rational opinion of experts the supreme authority in moral arguments (Hawthorne, 
1976). 
It would seem that it is from Durkheim that modern sociology takes its dominant 
view of rationality, seeing it as not an individual product, but as part of the collective 
consciousness, and by that fact available to all normally functioning individuals of a 
society. Rationality carries with it the moral conviction of society and therefore can 
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define the appropriate form of action. This is because both morality and reason are 
social products and are subject to the rigors of the scientific method. Since reason 
is a social fact, and is observable in reality, the sociologist must only devise ways of 
measuring it. Once it can be measured and studied, it can then be harnessed to serve 
as a solution to social problems. 
This view of rationality is consistent with the overall reformist tone of most of 
Durkheim's sociology and has had long term effects on the discipline of sociology. 
It has formed a way of doing research that gives credibility only to hard data and 
to empirical research methods and has also informed the perceptions of the role of 
sociology in society, thereby setting up the expectation that sociology can, in fact, 
define solutions to the question of what ought to be in society. 
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5. MAX WEBER 
In much the same way as Durkheim was to influence the fields of anthropology 
and history, the views of Max Weber on both the methods and substance of sociology 
would disproportionately affect the views of historians, anthropologists, and political 
scientists. 
Weber's thinking on rationality is the most elaborate of any social theorist. In 
fact, rationality is an underlying theme in almost all of his writings. While a small 
part of his thinking has had an impact on the field of sociology, his major theme -
the perspective of rationality- has received much less attention than other aspects of 
his theories. 
Weber did not merely continue in the Enlightenment tradition of optimistic faith 
in the rationalization of the world (Brubaker, 1984), saying, 
It is important to clear up this misunderstanding as to correct the mis­
taken view that the fact that concept formation takes a more or less 
rationalistic form implies that rational motives should be held always to 
predominate or, indeed, any kind of positive valuation of 'rationalism' 
(Runciman, 1978:21). 
He saw this irresistible force as "an abomination to every system of fraternal 
ethics" (cited in Brubaker, 1984:3). As a consequence, Weber makes a highly de­
tailed analysis of rationality in which he teases out many finely put and critical 
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distinctions within the general concept. For Weber, rationality was not one concept 
but a multiplicity of concepts (Levine, 1981). This analysis is summarized in several 
places (Kalberg, 1980; Levine, 1981; and Brubaker, 1984). 
Weber first makes the distinction between formal and substantive rationality. 
He is clarifying what are two distinctly different orientations of rationality. Formal 
rationality is basically a matter of fact. It refers to the calculability of means and pro­
cedures (Brubaker, 1984); a methodical ordering through the establishment of fixed 
rules and routines. This form of rationality is oriented around maximizing the pre­
dictability of activities and norms, and minimizing the influence of personal ties and 
social sentiments (Levine, 1981). Spheres of action that are highly rational from the 
formal view point include: capitalism, science, technology, and the modern legal and 
administration systems (Brubaker, 1984). While there is no direct correspondence, 
Weber's formal rationality fits somewhat well into to Durkheim's view of rationality. 
Substantive rationality, on the other hand, is a matter of value. It is oriented 
toward the values of ends or results (Brubaker, 1984). Substantive rationality gives 
predominance to ethical imperatives, utilitarian rules, or political maxims (Levine, 
1981). It is the process of establishing sets of valuative standards against which the 
empirically given can be assessed. The example Weber most often gives of substantive 
rationality is religion. 
What is rational in the formal sense is irrational in the substantive sense. The 
reason for this being that formal and substantive rationality are oriented toward 
two very different standards. Substantive rationality is oriented toward some over­
arching value and the desire to achieve motivational integrity (Levine, 1981). Formal 
rationality is oriented toward clearly stipulated procedures; the wish to act within a 
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calculable order to achieve a given end (Levine, 1981). 
The clearest example Weber uses is of the Puritan working and obtaining wealth 
in a calling. This action is formally rational because the Puritan has established a 
way of life based on fixed rules and routines in order to determine whether or not 
each individual was one of God's chosen. The only sign of this chosen status is to be 
successful in one's calling, therefore the Puritan will live in a calculated fashion in 
order to obtain wealth and thereby a sign of chosen status. This action is irrational 
from a substantive point of view because it does not embody any ethic or value, but 
is in fact self-serving. 
Weber felt that the distinction between substantive and formal rationality was 
important for several reasons, but primarily because there is constant tension between 
substantive and formal rationality. What is rational from one point of view is irra­
tional from the other. This conflict is primarily over values: calculability, efficiency, 
and impersonality on the one hand; and fraternity, equality and brotherly-love on the 
other (Brubaker, 1984). Weber viewed this conflict as one source of social problems. 
According to Weber, social life is marked by perennial, indeed intensifying 
conflict over ends (especially ultimate ends) and beliefs (especially life-
orienting metaphysical beliefs) - conflict that cannot be resolved through 
any neutral procedure (Brubaker, 1984: 4). 
This conflict over ends and beliefs brings to mind the functionalist view that 
poverty is functional for society. While this is a perfectly rational way of viewing 
poverty from a formal standpoint, from the substantive standpoint, it is inhumane. 
For Weber, this irreconcilability of judgements spelled out the limits of ratio­
nality as an organizing principle of social life, thereby dismissing the Enlightenment 
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hope in reason. Weber rejected the idea that science can determine what ought to be 
in society. Science can determine what is, but does not have the capacity to inform 
value judgements. There is no scientific way to choose one value over another. 
It is now helpful to consider the four types of social action that Weber discussed: 
traditional, afFectual, wertrational, and zweckrational (Runciman, 1978). It must 
be pointed out that Weber did not see most social action as rational (Runciman, 
1978). Weber only defined two of the four types of action he discusses as rational: 
wertrational and zweckrational. Action is rational for Weber only when individuals 
are the self-conscious, deliberate authors of their acts (Brubaker, 1981). 
Traditional action is action dictated by habits or custom. Afi'ectual action is 
action determined by strong feelings or emotions such as revenge, pleasure or release 
of emotional impulses (Runciman, 1978). Wertrational action is action guided by a 
conscious belief in the intrinsic value in a certain way of acting regardless of the con­
sequences (Brubaker, 1984). Action taken out of "conviction based on duty, honour, 
beauty, religious doctrine, piety, or the importance of any kind of 'cause'" (Runci­
man, 1978:29). Put another way, wertrational action is oriented toward consistency 
with some value believed inherent , in certain ways of acting. 
Zweckrational action is action directed by a conscious calculation to achieve some 
desired ends with appropriate means. It is oriented toward anticipated and intended 
consequences. 
A person acts rationally in the 'means-ends' sense when his action is 
guided by considerations of ends, means and secondary consequences; 
when in action, he rationally assesses means in relation to ends, ends in 
relation to secondary consequences, and finally, the various possible ends 
in relation to each other (Runciman, 1978:30). 
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Both of the rational forms of action can have either substantive or formal orien- , 
tations. 
Weber then makes a third distinction about rationality that applies specifically 
to wertrational and zweckrational social action. This distinction refers to judgements 
made about rationality. Both wertrational and zweckrational are defined &om the 
point of view of the actor - subjectively. An action is wertrational because of the 
actor's subjective belief in the intrinsic value of a particular way of acting (Brubaker, 
1984). 
An action is zweckrational because of the actor's expectations about the con­
sequences of his acts and because of his conscious efforts to bring about these con­
sequences. The objective correctness of the belief or the expectations is irrelevant 
to the subjective rationality of his action (Brubaker, 1984). The point is that the 
judgement about whether the action is rational or not is made by the actor. 
Weber then points out what he refers to as objectively correct rationality. Ob­
jective rationality refers to 'correctness' from a technical point of view (Brubaker, 
1984): whether the actor uses the technically correct means according to scientific 
knowledge or to some process of systematization (Levine, 1981). The point here is 
that the judgement of rationality is made by an observer. 
Both subjective and objective rationality imply the "exact calculation of ap­
propriate means for efficient and methodical acquisition of a given end." (Hearn, 
1985:75). Only zweckrational action can be subjectively and objectively rational. It 
is subjective when the actor makes conscious and deliberate calculations to achieve 
some given end. It is objective when the calculations of the actor are correct. 
To summarize Weber's theory thus far, Weber felt that rationality could be either 
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formally or substantively oriented. Social action could be rational or non-rational. 
There are two varieties of rational action: wertrational and zweckrational. While 
wertrational action can only be subjectively evaluated, zweckrational action be either 
subjectively or objectively evaluated. 
The distinction between objective and subjective rationality allows Weber to get 
at what he considers a major concern with the Enlightenment Project. While the 
selection of means can be objectively assessed, the selection of values cannot. 
. . .  i n  t h e  a r e a  o f  p r a c t i c a l  p o l i t i c a l  v a l u e - j u d g e m e n t s ,  ( e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e  
fields of economics and social policy), as soon as guidance for a valued 
course of action is to be sought, all that an empirical discipline with 
the means at its disposal can show is (i) the unavoidable means; (ii) 
the unavoidable side-effects; (iii) the resulting conflict of several possible 
value-judgements with each other in their practical consequences . . . 
All are entirely matters of choice or of compromise. There is no scientific 
procedure, either rational or empirical, of any kind which could provide 
a decision in such cases. Least of all can our strictly empirical science 
presume to spare the individual the necessity of making this choice, and 
so it should not even give the impression of being able to do so (Runciman, 
1978:85). 
It is at this point that the direction of Weber's thinking becomes clearer. Zweck­
rational action can either be evaluated by the actors or by the observer. Just as there 
is an inherent conflict between substantive and formal rational orientation, there is 
inherent conflict between subjectively and objectively evaluated rationality. What is 
subjectively rational from the actor's view point may be objectively irrational from 
the observer's. This for Weber, points out the limits of science as the objective arbiter 
of rational action (Brubaker, 1984). 
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Scientific knowledge can determine 'what is to be done' only when an 
unambiguous end is given and when there is an unambiguous way of 
comparing the rationality of alternative means of achieving the given end 
(Brubaker, 1984:59). 
This limitation is largely ignored by sociology today. Much of our research fol­
lows in the Enlightment tradition and goes about selecting the right ends for society 
to pursue. Examples include studies that define "functional families", "healthy or­
ganizations", or "developed nations". 
The value-judgements made by researchers in the research itself are clothed in the 
mantel of zweckrational science as they go about studying "the most efficient", "the 
most cost effective", "the least disruptive". While it is clear that these superlatives 
imply some standard by which the alternative is assessed, the mantel of "science" 
creates an air of irrefutability. 
Weber warned against just such misuse of rationality: "That there is always a 
risk of rationalistic interpretations being proposed in the wrong places is admittedly 
undeniable. All experience, unfortunately, confirms this" (Runcimaji, 1978:10). 
For Weber, science is equipped to inform the selection process between various 
ends and to assess progress towards those ends, but the criteria used in selecting ends 
is strictly a value-judgement and cannot be made by science. 
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6. ANALYSIS 
One of the major differences between Weber's and Durkheim's theories rests in 
their views on the origin of rationality. For Weber, reason is an inherent characteristic 
of humans. Humans have an innate capacity for rational action (Kalberg, 1980). 
Durkheim combines individuals' ability to reason with their moral sense and 
declares them both to be social products. Durkheim also sees morality, science, and 
rationality as one concept. For Weber, it is clear that rationality is in fact many 
concepts. 
For Durkheim, rationality was simply assumed. Rationality was not to be ques­
tioned; it was a fact, just as real as any other social fact. For this reason, it is almost 
unfair to discuss Durkheim's view of rationality in the same light as Weber's. It's 
fatal weakness stems from the fact that it is not a theory at all. It is merely an 
assumption. With it, Durkheim did not seek to explain or predict. For him, there is 
no role for values, because there is only one set of valid values for society- the col­
lective consciousness. That is why it is truly ironic that it is Durkheim's conception 
of rationality that most often informs empirical research in sociology. 
Most sociologists today believe, as did Comte and Durkheim, that science can 
provide answers to social problems. From this positivists frame of reference, we 
number, count, analyze, and decide, truly believing that science can provide answers. 
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This is the point where the strength of Weber's theory shines through. 
Weber made only one assumption about rationality: namely that humans are 
capable of reason. He clearly pointed out the value-laden nature of the concept 
with the distinction between formal and substantive rationality. This distinction has 
had a lasting effect on sociological empirical research. By making a clear separation 
between rationality based on rules, and rationality based on values, Weber opened 
the door for the notion of value-neutrality. Sociologists are well acquainted with this 
Weberian notion, but it would seem that few bother to read past his mandate for 
value-free research. 
Those that do discover that the distinction also points to the explorations of ten­
sions inherent in the modern order. What is formally rational may be substantively 
irrational. As Brubaker (1984:38) points out, the "formal rationality of the modern 
economic order rests on institutional foundations that are morally and politically 
problematic". Here again the example of poverty being functional for the system and 
inhumane for people comes to mind. 
To the extent actors share ends and beliefs, there can be agreement in their 
judgements of rationality. However, if these ends and beliefs are not held in common, 
there will be no agreement over rationality. 
Weber did not believe that science can dictate a 'solution' to problems of social 
policy (Brubaker, 1984). 
Even such simple questions as the extent to which an end should sanc­
tion unavoidable means, or the extent to which undesired repercussions 
should be taken into consideration. . . are entirely matters of choice or 
compromise. There is no (rational or empirical) scientific procedure of 
any kind whatsoever which can provide us with a decision here (cited in 
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Brubaker, 1984:59). 
Matters of fact (formal rationality) can inform the decision making process, but 
cannot decide matters of value (substantive rationality). 
While Weber does not seek to predict using his schema, the explanation he pro­
vides for rational action is unsurpassed. He assigns a decisive role to values and 
provides insight as to why verstehen is so crucial for his sociology. Subjective ra­
tionality points out that the meaning of actions to actors is primarily important 
because it is the actor who defines what is rational. This dictates the need for the 
use of qualitative methods in sociology to uncover these actor generated meanings. 
The application of Weber's theory to empirical research can be helpful in several 
ways. First, it would cause sociology to focus on what it can do: identify affected 
interest groups and their interests, define means to achieve various ends, and identify 
unintended consequences of the various ends and means. Second, it would free us from 
the unrewarding role of social prophet. A sociology that claims to be able to select 
scientifically the ends to which society should strive is one that is poorly equipped for 
its task. This has led sociology to many misdirected and fuzzy recommendations to 
policy makers. As a result, the discipline as a whole is overshadowed in policy circles 
by the other social sciences because of our past failed prophecy. Finally, it opens up 
to scientific exploration the connection between human action and values. This was 
a fascination for Weber as his study on the Protestant Ethic illustrates. Instead of 
excluding values from the study of sociology, we should be studying the impact of 
various value orientations on everyday life. 
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PART II. 
SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT: WEBER ON VALUE 
FREEDOM AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
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1. ABSTRACT 
Value freedom is a central concept in policy analysis. This concept was given 
to the social sciences by Max Weber. Popular conceptions of the term have long 
reaching implications for the policy sciences. These popular conceptions, however, 
do not accurately reflect Weber's use of value freedom. This paper explores these 
popular conceptions in light of Weber's writings. 
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2. SCIENCE AND VALUE FREEDOM 
Nowhere is the concept of value free science more prominent than in social policy 
analysis. The assumption is made that politics is value laden but science is value free. 
This assumption leads to other related assumptions that have a great impact on the 
field. 
These theoretical and philosophical assumptions that underpin current social 
policy research should bear closer scrutiny. It will also be fruitful to consult the 
source of value freedom, Max Weber, to assess how accurately this concept is applied. 
In a discussion of sociological analysis and social policy, Coleman (1978) describes 
the widely accepted two worlds dichotomy. According to this schema, the world of 
the discipline and the world of action are two totally different spheres of existence. 
The world of action consists of a sequence of actions and responses among 
a variety of parties. As such, it has two properties not shared by the world 
of the discipline: interested parties, whose interests in a given action differ, 
and sometime conflict; and time, since the actions are embedded in a 
sequence, with those later in the sequence dependent on those earlier. . . 
. The world of action tolerates secrecy, privacy, pursuit of interests, and 
diversity of values (Coleman, 1978; p 687) 
The world of the discipline is of another character. 
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The disciplinary world is a world of knowledge abstracted from the world 
of action, but having a separate existence and a separate structure. The 
norms or values of the discipline favor disinterested inquiry, a search for 
truth, and full communication of information (Coleman, 1978:687). 
Coleman states that this distinction stems from the fact that problems arise in 
the world of action but sociological analysis of policy is performed in the world of 
the discipline (Coleman, 1978). The information obtained from this analysis is then 
returned to the world of action. From this standpoint, the policy researcher plays 
one of three roles: 
• An agent of the party whose policy is studied. 
• An agent of a "third party" who represents persons whom the policy affects. 
• An independent researcher. 
It is clear from Coleman's dichotomy, the two worlds hypothesis (1978), and 
the roles assigned the policy analyst that the area of policy analysis makes several 
assumptions: 
• Scientists are value free. 
• Science itself is value free. 
• Science uncovers truth. 
• The discipline is isolated from the world of action. 
• That science can and should provide answers to policy questions. 
Each of these will be dealt with in turn. Before proceeding, however, it is 
important to understand exactly what is meant by value freedom and for that we 
must turn to Max Weber. 
3. THE POLICY LITERATURE 
There seems to be much confusion in the area of policy analysis as to Weber's 
conceptualization of value freedom and its role in policy analysis and social change. 
Coleman states that Max Weber did not address how sociological analysis might be­
come an element in social change, or allow a role for sociological analysis (Coleman, 
1978). This assessment is puzzling given the striking similarities between Coleman's 
two worlds thesis and Weber's pronouncements in The Methodology of the Social Sci­
ences (1949). In these three essays: The Meaning of "Ethical Neutrality" in Sociology 
and Economics, "Objectivity" in Social Science and Social Policy, and Critical Stud­
ies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences, Weber makes many pronouncements about 
the role of the social sciences in social change. Most of these pronouncements center 
around the concept of value freedom. 
Hawkesworth (1988) in a later article describes several models of policy anal­
ysis, one of which he labels "Weberian". He describes his "Weberian" model as 
"promising rationality, objectivity, and certitude (Hawkesworth, 1988:21). Neither 
Hawkesworth or Coleman accurately embody the wealth of Weber's pronouncements 
on social policy analysis. The purpose of this paper is to explore Weberian sociology's 
pronouncements on public policy in the light of these two popular conceptions of it. 
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4. WEBER ON VALUE FREEDOM 
A closer examination of Weber's writing reveals important distinctions that the 
policy analyst would do well to remember. Most sociologists today are familiar with 
Weber's prescription for value free research. But it is important to stress that for 
Weber, value freedom was not a property of science or a characteristic of the scientist 
as it appears to be for Coleman. Value freedom is an ideal that the scientist should 
strive for, and Weber makes it clear that this is not a task to take lightly. 
To better understand his position, it is necessary to understand the distinction 
Weber makes between value judgement and value relevance. He credits this distinc­
tion to the German philosopher Heinrich Richert (Weber, 1949). 
Weber defined value judgements as: 
practical evaluations regarding the desirability or undesirability of social 
facts from ethical, cultural or other points of view (Weber, 1949; p 10). 
An actual "value-judgement" . . . does not imply that I subsume them 
under a certain class-concept. . . Rather, the "value-judgement" involves 
my "taking an attitude" in a certain concrete way to the object in its 
concrete individuality; the subjective sources of this attitude of mine, of 
my "value-standpoint" . . . (are) thoroughly concrete, highly individually 
structured and constituted "feelings" and "preference" (Weber, 1949:150) 
It was Weber's position that value judgements should be excluded from teach­
ing and empirical investigation, thereby giving science a value free position. This 
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is because the position of teacher, or scientist carries with it authority. Those ex­
pounding opinions from positions of authority without making it cleax that these are 
opinions, give their opinions the weight of facts (Weber, 1949). Weber found this 
untenable. 
The position Weber takes on value judgements anticipates the criticism of policy 
analysis made by Weaver that 
. . . the aura of realism exuded by quantitative measures undermines 
non-experts' critical responses ("they can't argue with the 'facts'") while 
simultaneously validating highly implausible claims (Hawkesworth, 1988: 
W); 
and the criticism by Tribe that there are 
. . . multiple means by which policy analysis merges with a technical 
rhetoric in which "passion learns to pose as reason" by proclaiming its 
strategies for formulating questions, organizing information, and devel­
oping answers to be value-free, despite their commitments to substantive 
conclusions (Hawkesworth, 1988:26). 
It is clear from his writings that freedom from value judgements (value freedom) 
is not something that Weber assumes exists, either in the scientist or in science itself. 
Rather it is a prescription Weber gives to scientists and teachers as something that 
they must strive for. As will become clear later in this discussion, the concept of 
"interests" plays a larger role in Weber's conceptualization of social science and is 
not excluded from the world of the discipline as in the two worlds dichotomy, or in 
Hawkesworth's "Weberian" model of policy analysis. 
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Because "interests" direct science and the scientist, this interferes with value 
freedom. Exclusion of "interests" is the consistent labor of the scholar doing empirical 
work. Yet, Weber did not underestimate the size of this task: 
Nor need I discuss further whether the distinction between empirical state­
ments of fact and value-judgements is 'difficult' to make. It is. All of us 
. . . encounter the subject time and again (Weber, 1949:9). 
For Weber "interests" are more than simple individual prejudices made by an 
individual or a society, they are what separates what is knowledge from what is not. 
For this, Weber uses Richert's term value relevance. 
Value relevance is defined by Weber as: 
the philosophical interpretation of that specifically scientific 'interest' 
which determines the selection of a given subject-matter and the problems 
of an empirical analysis (Weber, 1949:22). 
If it is not clear from this definition that Weber saw science as less than presup-
positionless, the following passage should clear up any confusion: 
The problems of the empirical disciplines are ... to be solved 'noneval-
uatively'. They are not problems of evaluation. But the problems of 
the social sciences are selected by the value-relevance of the phenom­
ena treated ... In empirical investigation, no 'practical evaluations' 
are legitimated by this strictly logical fact. But together with historical 
experience, it shows that cultural (i.e. evaluative) interests give purely 
empirical scientific work its direction (Weber, 1949:21-22). 
Weber goes farther and states that all that we know about society is shaped by 
value judgements. 
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All knowledge of cultural reality. . . is knowledge from particular points 
of view. ... If the notion that those standpoints can be derived from the 
"facts themselves" continually recurs, it is due to the naive self-deception 
of the specialist who is unaware that it is due to the evaluative ideas 
with which he unconsciously approaches his subject matter, that he has 
selected from an absolute infinity a tiny portion with the study of which 
he concerns himself (Weber, 1977:31-32) 
In Weber's view, the "facts themselves" are only available to science if they fit 
into the value relevant schema of that science, scientist, and epoch. Facts that fall 
outside the scope of this world view do not "exit". 
Further, science itself is merely one valued activity among many. Western society 
values science as the arbitrator of truth, but that is a social convention and not 
inherent in "reality". Even though it is considered by Western society as the best, 
it is not the ultimate or only tool for uncovering facts. For Weber, science itself is a 
social construction. 
. , . hair-line which separates science from faith . . . The objective 
validity of all empirical knowledge rests exclusively upon the ordering of 
the given reality according to categories which are subjective in a specific 
sense, namely, in that they present the presuppositions of our knowledge 
and are based on the presupposition of the value of those truths which 
empirical knowledge alone is able to give us. The means available to our 
science offer nothing to those persons to whom this truth is of no value. 
It should be remembered that the belief in the value of scientific truth 
is the product of certain cultures and is not a product of man's original 
nature (Weber, 1977:36). 
Weber uses the term "truth" very loosely. He did not see science as uncovering 
truth in its absolutist sense. Truth is in the eye of the beholder. 
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For scientific truth is precisely what is valid for all who seek the truth 
(Weber, 1977:33). 
Science, then, is a tool we use to make sense of the world as it is perceived by 
us. It is a method of categorizing and understanding the world. Empirical data are 
always seen through value laden categories. Pure "objectivity" is not possible. 
In the empirical social sciences . . . the possibility of meaningful knowl­
edge of what is essential for us in the infinite richness of events is bound 
up with the unremitting application of viewpoints of a specifically partic­
ularized character, which, in the last analysis, are oriented on the basis 
of evaluative ideas. These evaluative ideas are for their part empirically 
discoverable and analyzable as elements of meaningful human conduct, 
but their validity can not be deduced from empirical data as such. The 
"objectivity" of the social sciences depends rather on the fact that the 
empirical data are always related to those evaluative ideas which alone 
make them worth knowing and the significance of the empirical data is 
derived from these evaluative ideas (Weber, 1977:36-37) 
The essence of "science as a tool" or social convention can be seen in a lengthy 
discussion of the multiplication table. Weber states that: 
For the purposes of empirical, sociological or historical analysis, our mul­
tiplication table, as the object of such an analysis, is a maxim of practical 
conduct which is valid according to the conventions of a given culture 
and which is adhered to more or less closely. It is nothing more than this 
(Weber, 1949:39). 
He goes on to say: 
This transformation of normatively valid truths into conventionally valid 
opinions, to which all intellectual activities, including even logic or math­
ematics, are subject whenever they become the objects of empirical anal­
ysis is completely independent of the fact that the normative validity of 
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logical and mathematical propositions is at the same time that a priori 
basis of all empirical science. . . . one must guard one's self against the 
belief that . . . what is normatively correct has, from the point of view 
of logic, the same function as it has in its general position as the a priori 
of all scientific investigation. . . . The means employed by the method of 
"understanding explanation" are not normative correctness, but rather, . 
. . the conventional habits of the investigator and teacher in thinking in 
a particular way (Weber, 1949:40-41). 
Therefore, while we use science as the measure of truth, it is not truth in the 
absolutist sense. It is the means we use to make sense of society. The danger for 
policy analysis in seeing science as uncovering truth lies in the fact that this view 
fails to see that there exists other "truths" that are equally valid. The "truth" of 
minority poor could be extremely different from the "truth" as perceived by white 
university educated researchers. 
Weber's views on science seem to have more in common with what Hawkesworth 
terms depoliticizing scientism than with the strictly cost-benefit analysis model he 
labels "Weberian". This view uncovers science as an ideology and is critical of value 
judgements posing as "facts". Value freedom when applied to Weber's ideas is itself 
a misnomer, for it is clear that he could not have felt that any meaningful human 
activity can be truly value free. Value honesty is perhaps a better term, for Weber 
surely felt that the teacher and scientist should make clear the value judgements 
embodied in their work. 
It is also clear that Weber did not see the discipline as isolated from the world of 
action. He rejects the idea of abstract laws of human behavior. The world of action 
informs and defines the world of the discipline. 
an "objective" analysis of cultural events, which proceeds according 
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to the thesis that the ideal of science is the reduction of empirical reality 
of "laws" is meaningless. It is not meaningless . . . because cultural 
or psychic events for instance are "objectively" less governed by laws. 
It is meaningless for a number of other reasons. Firstly, because the 
knowledge of social laws is not knowledge of social reality but is rather 
one of the various aids used by our minds for attaining this end; secondly, 
because knowledge of cultural events is inconceivable except on a basis of 
the significance which the concrete constellations of reality have for use in 
certain indmdua/concrete situations. . . . "Culture" is a finite segment of 
the meaningless infinity of the world process, a segment on which human 
beings confer meaning and significance (Weber, 1977:30-31). 
Social science is inconceivable when separated from social action. The world of 
action gives meaning to the world of the discipline. This is more than saying that 
the world of action defines the problems that the discipline studies. Though Weber 
certainly felt that that is also true, it means that separate from the world of action, 
the world of the discipline does not exist in any meaningful way. This dismisses 
the notion of research occurring in an "ivory tower". For even inside such a tower, 
influences from the "tainted" world at large permeate. Those who are skeptical of 
this,fact are advised to attempt to fund research for which no outside grant agency 
has a vested interest. 
Hawkesworth describes his "Weberian" model as: 
Policy-making develops feom a process dominated by politics to a pro­
cess in which expertise plays an increasingly significant role . . . soci­
ety becomes more fully rationalized, partisan politics gives way to scien­
tific investigation of the most efficient means to realize policy objectives 
(Hawkesworth, 1988:17). 
This increasing "rationalization" of society and the displacement of politics by 
science is something that Weber decries. Weber describes two types of rationality. 
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one based on means-ends calculations and another based on consistency with values 
(Weber, 1978). The increasing "rationalization" of society is simply the replacement 
of value rational action by means-ends rational action. In fact, Weber saw this trend 
as " an abomination to every system of fraternal ethics" (Brubaker, 1984:3). Weber 
evaluates a "rational" society harshly: 
Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines 
that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved (Weber, 
1989:182). 
Given these views of Weber's it is unclear how Hawkesworth can credit him with 
such a scientistic model. Weber clearly states that: 
. . .  i n  t h e  a r e a  o f  p r a c t i c a l  p o l i t i c a l  v a l u e - j u d g e m e n t s ,  ( e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e  
fields of economics and social policy), as soon as guidance for a valued 
course of action is to be sought, all that an empirical discipline with 
the means at its disposal can show is (i) the unavoidable means; (ii) 
the unavoidable side-effects; (iii) the resulting conflict of several possible 
value-judgments with each other in their practical consequences. . . All 
are entirely matters of choice or of compromise. There is no scientific 
procedure, either rational or empirical, of any kind which could provide 
a decision in such cases. Least of all can our strictly empirical science 
presume to spare the individual the necessity of making this choice, and 
so it should not even give the impression of being able to do so (Weber, 
1978:85). 
Weber states in many places that science cannot and should not attempt to 
provide answers to policy questions. 
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Each new fact may necessitate the re-adjustment of the relations between 
end and indispensable means, between desired goals and unavoidable sub­
sidiary consequences. But whether this readjustment should be the prac­
tical conclusions to be drawn therefrom is not answerable by empirical 
science. . . (Weber, 1949:23). 
Science explains relationships between means and ends, and between goals and 
consequences, but cannot give guidance as to what society should do. 
Science should especially avoid legitimating any one pattern of behavior over 
any other. In a discussion on whether people behave in certain ways in order to 
"succeed", Weber agreed that that seemed to be a trend, but that science should not 
advocate this behavior as "correct". 
In any case, it is not easily intelligible why the practitioners of an em­
pirical science should feel the need of furthering this kind of behavior by 
providing their salute of approval for existing "trends". Nor do we see 
why empirical scientists should transform the adaptation to these "trends" 
from an ultimate value-problem, to be solved only by the individual as his 
conscience dictates with reference to each particular situation, into a prin­
ciple ostensibly based on the authority of a "science" (Weber, 1949:23). 
. . . even indisputably "technically correct" economic actions are not 
validated through this quality alone (Weber, 1949:38). 
Social actions can be judged both by how well they achieve a desired goal or by 
how consistent they are with a given value orientation. Both evaluations are valid. 
Only a value judgement can decide which evaluation is "best". 
. . . actions are to be judged not merely by their instrumental value but 
by their intrinsic value as well. In any case, the failure to recognize this 
fact impedes our understanding of reality (Weber, 1949:24). 
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"Correct" in an empirical sense does not equal "correct" in the social context. 
Weber states that there are three things that social science can offer to policy anal­
ysis: unavoidable means, unavoidable side-effects, and the resulting conflict between 
several value judgements. Beyond this, science does not employ the means to settle 
policy questions, for there one enters the realm of value judgements. 
Only in the case of an unambiguous end can science attempt to provide answer 
to policy questions 
Strictly and exclusively empirical analysis can provide a solution only 
where it is a question of a means adequate to the realization of an absolute 
unambiguously given end (Weber, 1949:26.) 
Weber's definition of "unambiguous" makes clear that these types of ends are a 
luxury not afforded to policy analysis: 
The evaluations are unambiguous only when the economic end and the 
social context are definitely given and all that remains is to choose be­
tween several economic means, when these differ only with respect to their 
certainty, rapidity, and quantitative productiveness, and are completely 
identical in every other value-relevant aspect (Weber, 1949:37-38). 
Weber felt that social science should study values. It is only through compre­
hensive study of values and value orientations that science can hope to accomplish 
its task in an ethically neutral fashion. By uncovering the cultural and personal 
baggage carried by the social scientist, science can step closer to value freedom. But 
one should be careful to remember that like ideal types, true value freedom does not 
exist in reality (Weber, 1949). 
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We are far removed, then, from the view that the demand for the exclu­
sion of value-judgements in empirical analysis implies that discussions of 
evaluations are sterile or meaningless. . . . Such discussions assume an 
insight into the possibility of, in principle, unbridgeably divergent ulti­
mate evaluations. . . . First, we should reject Schmoller's implication 
that ethical imperatives are identical with "cultural values"— even the 
highest of them. For, from a certain standpoint, "cultural values" are 
"obligatory"— even where they are in inevitable and irreconcilable con­
flict with every sort of ethics (Weber, 1949:14-15) 
Value judgements themselves point out fruitful soil for research. A good example 
of such research is Weber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Weber, 
1989). 
The utility of a discussion of practical evaluations . . . can be extremely 
valuable for empirical research in the sense that it provides it with prob­
lems for investigation (Weber, 1949:21). 
Weber saw Sociology itself as primarily concerned with interpretive understand­
ing of social action. 
Sociology is a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding 
of social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and 
consequences. We shall speak of "action" insofar as the acting individual 
attaches a subjective meaning to his behavior - be it overt or covert. 
Action is "social" insofar as its subjective meaning takes account of the 
behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course (Weber, 1977:38) 
Understanding social action entails not only the exploration of causal linkages 
but also an understanding of motive, values, and how value orientations motivate 
individuals to act. Weber did not assume that all human behavior was empirically 
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rational. Much behavior is value oriented and this too must be the subject of Soci­
ology. Value free science alone cannot perform this task. 
We cannot discover, however, what is meaningful to us by means of a 
"presuppositionless" investigation of empirical data. Rather perception 
of its meaningfulness to us is the presupposition of its becoming an object 
of investigation (Weber, 1977:28). 
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5. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The policy analyst then should study how value orientation influences action 
and leave value judgements to politics: 
. . . the view which must be opposed most decisively of all is the fre­
quently found idea that the way to achieve scientific 'objectivity' is to 
balance the various value-judgements against each other and thus arrive 
at a 'statesman-like' compromise between them. ... It does not be­
long in the lecture hall, but in the political programme, the government 
department and the parliament. The sciences, both normative and em­
pirical, can perform only one invaluable service for the politicians and the 
opposing parties, and that is to say to them: (i) there are such and such 
conceivable 'ultimate' positions to be taken on this practical problem; (ii) 
such and such are the facts which you must take account of in choosing 
between these positions (Weber, 1978:77). 
This repudiates Hawkesworth's claim that Weber advocated scientists take over 
for politicians. 
The value relevance of phenomena must be included in any study. As a policy 
analyst in the Weberian tradition then, it is important to explore why an issue is 
important, not only to the researcher and various interest groups, but to society in 
general, and not to get side-tracked in the pursuit of empirical "laws". These are not 
questions answerable by "science". 
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We have designated as "cultural sciences" those disciplines which ana­
lyze the phenomena of life in terms of their cultural significance. The 
significance of a configuration of cultural phenomena and the basis of 
this significance cannot however be derived and rendered intelligible by a 
system of analytical laws . . . (Weber, 1977:27). 
The explication of causal laws are only the means of an investigation (Weber, 
1977). The fact that. Puritans would choose to maximize their earthly wealth is not 
as interesting as why they chose to do so. Therefore knowing that welfare payments 
are an ineffective means of eliminating poverty is not as important as knowing the 
mechanism at work that causes this to be the case. 
For Weber, "to predict in order to control" is not the mandate as it is for 
Durkheim. Weber was much more interested in explaining in order to understand. 
To do this, he did not find general laws of behavior very useful. 
The focus of attention on reality under the guidance of values which lend 
it significance and the selection and ordering of phenomena which are 
thus aifected in the light of their cultural significance is entirely different 
from the analysis of reality in terms of laws and general concepts . . 
. Wherever the causal explanation of a "cultural phenomenon" . . . 
is, under consideration, the knowledge of causal laws is not the end of 
the investigation but only a means. It facilitates and renders possible 
the causal imputation to their concrete causes of those components of 
a phenomenon the individuality of which is culturally significant. . . . 
And the more "general", i.e., the more abstract the laws, the less they 
can contribute to the causal imputation of individual phenomena, and 
more indirectly, to the understanding of the significance of cultural events 
(Weber, 1977:28-29). 
In summary: 
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In the empirical social sciences, , . . the possibility of meaningful knowl­
edge of what is essential for use in the infinite richness of events is bound 
up with the unremitting application of viewpoints of a specifically partic­
ularized character, which, in the last analysis, are oriented on the basis 
of evaluative ideas. These evaluative ideas are for their part empirically 
discoverable and analyzable as elements of meaningful human conduct, 
but their validity cannot be deduced from empirical data as such. The 
"objectivity" of the social sciences depends rather on the fact that the 
empirical data are always related to those evaluative ideas which alone 
make them worth knowing and the significance of the empirical data is 
derived from these evaluative ideas (Weber, 1977:36-37). 
From this point of view, it is more important for the policy analyst to study the 
value judgements involved in following various public policy decisions than to simply 
advocate the adoption of the most "effective" policy. 
Popular conceptions of Weber as the champion of "value freedom" (as it is com­
monly understood) or as mute on the question of the role of sociology in social change 
are ill conceived. Weber sets up value freedom as an unreachable ideal type for the 
scientist to strive for and to use in a critical assessment of science. Policy analysts 
should, from Weber's point of view, continually study not only causal linkages but 
more importantly the value judgements embodied in the study of these linkages. In 
fact, Weber saw the discovery of causal linkages as a means to the better understand­
ing of value orientations. 
We do not study phenomena presuppositionlessly because all social phenomena is 
charged with meaning. Rather we choose to study phenomena and choose to explore 
various causal linkages based on what is of value to ourselves and society. 
Regardless of how one conceives of the "validity of the values is in any 
case something which is an empirical truth, even if both should in the 
56 
last analysis also be conceived of philosophically as normatively bound. 
The "points of view", which are oriented towards "values", from which 
we consider cultural objects and from which they become "objects" of 
historical research, change (Weber, 1949:159) 
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PART III. 
SCHOLARS IN THE IRON CAGE 
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1. ABSTRACT 
The ideology of value freedom and the inherent mythology of academic freedom 
has led to an epidemic of value blindness in academics. This value blindness creates 
serious dilemmas for modern academics. This paper discusses the historical context 
of the concept of value freedom with particular attention being given to the writings 
of Max Weber. The relationship between value freedom and academic freedom, and 
its implications for modern academics are outlined. 
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2. INTRODUCTION 
Our society is preoccupied with a form of cold, calculating, means-ends ratio­
nality. It has led to the reification of an ideology of "value-freedom" in academic 
institutions, and has been facilitated to some degree by the exclusion of value ori­
ented rationality from scholarly thought and writing. The current usage of the term 
rationality only incorporates the search for thé appropriate means to a given end, 
with both evaluated from the point of view of the observer and not the actor. The 
exclusion of values from the application of rationality leads to the exclusion of values 
in science, for values are not required for means-ends judgements. Therefore, science 
has come to be seen as valid if it is value-free. 
However, the error in this conclusion arises in that the first premise is flawed, 
for rational action can be value oriented. This point is beautifully made by Weber 
when he points out that science cannot be truly value-free because the "facts" we 
choose to study are chosen from a value laden context. Some "things" and not others 
are of interest to science only because they hold some value for the scientist or for 
society. Ignorance of this point of view has led modern academics into a state of 
value blindness, for in the guise of being value-free, we have turned a blind eye to the 
values embedded in our research and in the whole academic process. This has lulled 
the academic into a false sense of security that often masquerades as " academic 
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freedom". The truth is often far uglier. 
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3. HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT 
It will perhaps be of some interest to find the origins of the thesis of value 
freedom. The first point to make concerns the so-called "Is-Ought", "Fact-Value" or 
"Descriptive-Prescriptive" distinction, which serves as the core concept underlying 
many versions of the value neutrality thesis. 
David Hume (Hume, 1975) made the point that logic can never allow us to derive 
an "ought" from an "is". That is, no statement of value can be logically derived 
from factual premises alone. While this may be true enough, what does it prove? 
For one thing, Hume assumes that only deductive justifications are possible. But if 
there are other ways of justifying assertions, then Hume's argument only shows that 
any attempt to justify value judgements by deductive syllogisms with only factucd 
premises will fail. That is about all that this point by Hume proves. 
However, Hume has another argument, which has a .bearing on the idea of value 
freedom. For Hume, inductive or empirical reasoning is always seen as circular, 
and hence invalid, both in science and elsewhere (Hume, 1955). It follows from 
this, and from Hume's arguments, that deduction cannot increase empirical-including 
scientific- knowledge which is based on habit, psychology and custom, and is thus 
not rational (Hume, 1975). 
Hume did not believe, however, that value judgements are any more (or less) ir­
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rational than scientific judgements. Moreover Hume had a "naturalistic" view about 
values; that is, value judgements are rooted in universal human facts regarding sym­
pathy: this is a view he shared with the British Moralists such as Adam Smith, 
and the writers of the Scottish Enlightenment (Hume, 1975). Consequently value 
judgements, though different from factual, are not inferior to them. 
Hume (1957), indeed, can be seen as the first modern thinker to spell out the idea 
of value relevance. Specifically, according to Hume (1957), all our beliefs, scientific 
and otherwise, are rooted in, and colored by, human nature, including feelings and 
psychological mechanisms; Custom is king; and habit and instincts'serve this ruler 
as the only guides in life. All our beliefs, including science, logic, and mathematics 
are rooted in and colored by facts about human nature. 
Emmanuel Kant, who wanted to refute Hume's skeptical conclusions, divided 
reason into three mutually independent but complimentary spheres: science, morality, 
and aesthetics. This is a view Weber made use of in defending his thesis of value 
neutrality. For Kant, then, each type of claim has its legitimate uses and limits and 
they are, moreover, complementary, for science leaves off where morality begins. The 
two do not conflict; nor do they have any relations with each other (Kant, 1965). 
The crux of the matter is that facts and values belong to different spheres. 
In addition, Kant's (1964) "Copernican revolution in philosophy" developed the 
idea that experience is always categorized and structured by built in cognitive- in­
terpretive principles of the human mind, and that reality for us is, therefore, always 
human reality. This is supposed to limit knowledge to save religion and morality but 
it does so at a cost: Moral judgements are not knowledge, and can only be "proved" 
on pragmatic grounds and formal criteria of consistency. Further, for Kant, objectiv­
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ity refers to the object of possible experience or knowledge, which implies the same 
result: moral judgements are not objects of knowledge, for only science yields knowl­
edge (of objects of experience). There were many writers after Kant, notably Hegel, 
on the one hand, and Positivists, on the other, who modified the views of Kant and 
Hume, in various ways, which cannot be detailed here. Briefly, Hegel historicized 
knowledge and the categories, whereas the Positivists rendered value judgements as 
either subjective or as naturalized data, reducible to science. 
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4. RELATED ISSUES 
In this regard, there are several other background developments which deserve 
mention. The first is Nietzsche's view of the world as a Heracleitian flux that can only 
be understood as an aesthetic phenomenon. There is no fixed, objective, determinate 
reality to discover; no properties or structures that constitute "the truth". Everything 
is an interpretation, rooted in the values and perspectives of the knower and culture, 
which in turn are outgrowths of the conditions required for each type of person and 
culture to enhance their lives. Truth, according to Nietzche, are those kinds of errors, 
falsifications and simplifications which are necessary for a type of life. 
Nietzsche's perspectivism, which casts doubt on the ideas of objectivity, truth, 
knowledge, reality, and connects inquiry with interpretation and values, influences 
the Neo-Kantians, and especially Weber, whose thesis of value relevance is a direct 
application of Nietzsche's ideas. There are many perspectives, interests, values; all 
are limited and incomplete, require interpretation (ideal types), and preclude the sort 
of methods which talk of objective, disinterested ways of absorbing hard facts. Yet 
the idea of value freedom requires that a certain amount of objectivity (in the form 
of meaning and causal adequacy) is both desirable and achievable. 
In the second issue, the development of the German idea of Geisteswissenschaften 
or human sciences, as an attack on Positivism, which was influenced by Romanti­
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cism and late 19th century Historicism (Dilthey), rejected the fact-value distinction 
and argued that all knowledge of culture must be both interpretive and inextrica­
bly value-laden. In this view, all spheres of culture and life are interconnected in 
an Hegelian fashion. It is this movement which gave rise to a crisis in methodology 
which culminated in Weber's many writings on the subject of methodology (Proctor, 
1991;Bryant, 1985; Brunn, 1972; and Oakes, 1988). 
Writers such as Dilthey seemed to historicize all human knowledge and cate­
gories, and thus appeared to defend historical and value relativism. His work had a 
major influence on the Neo-Kantian movements that form the immediate background 
for Weber. Windleband, Rickert and other members of the so-called Southwestern 
School (Oakes and Bergner, 1981; Kohnke, 1991; Aaron, 1978; and Liebersohn, 1988) 
grappled with questions about nature and history, the natural sciences and the cul­
tural sciences, the role of values in methodology, choice of perspective and judgement. 
In addition, the Methodenstreit - could Economics be a positive science or only an 
historical discipline - played a major role in these developments (Bryant, 1985). 
Weber, a student of Rickert, attempted to solve these controversies by reconciling 
the various positions on the methodological questions about the human sciences by 
combining the concepts of "meaning adequacy" and "causal adequacy". His method 
of "ideal types" addresses the problems of Nietzsche's perspectivism that is, how to 
take one point of view and stiU achieve some kind of "objective" results. Contrary 
to Rickert, the values from which we take our bearings in research are not that 
of the individual, which are subjective values, but rather those of the culture, and 
the cultural significance of historical and social phenomena tends to determine our 
research perspective. These are values that are real from a cultural point of view. We 
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can overcome Rickert's hiatus irrationalis (the metaphysical gap between the "ought" 
and the "is" and, the world of repeatable, general laws and the unique individual) 
only in this way (Oakes, 1986; Oakes, 1988; Burger, 1976; and HufF, 1984). 
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5. IDEOLOGY OF VALUE FREEDOM 
While in the field of sociology the mandate for value free research is most often 
credited to Max Weber, his conceptualization of the term was more complex than its 
current usage. Weber made use of two concepts in his writings on the methodology 
of the social sciences that bear on this discussion: "value judgements" and "value 
relevance". Weber (1949:10) defined value judgements as: "practical evaluations 
regarding the desirability or undesirability of social facts from ethical, cultural or 
other points of view". Value relevance is defined by Weber (1949:22) as: 
the philosophical interpretation of that specifically scientific 'interest' 
which determines the selection of a given subject-matter and the problems 
of an empirical analysis. 
These two concepts relate to value freedom in that value judgements refer to 
the positive or negative evaluations given a thing, while value relevance refers to 
the interest taken in a thing. An example can be made in the case of Sociology's 
historic lack of study of women's lives. To say that this occurred because women's 
lives are less interesting than the lives of men is clearly a value judgement. To say 
that it occurred because to date most sociologist have been men, and therefore did 
not perceive women's lives as distinct subjects of study, exposes the value relevance 
of the decision. The first is a conscious decision on the part of the actor, while the 
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second represents a blind spot in a particular world view. 
Weber's view on value freedom stemmed from his transformation of values into 
subjective preferences (thus rejecting Hume's naturalism), which he said are priva­
tized in the interests of defending Luther's notion of the "calling": ultimate value 
judgements, including the (Kantian) values of Liberalism and Humanism, express the 
person's life choices in the iron cage. Science cannot and should not prove or disprove 
ultimate value judgements: as this would limit the individual's freedom, and destroy 
the last vestige of the kind of ultimate values that Kant wanted to defend against 
scientific encroachment. 
For Weber, the iron cage is constructed by the emphasis modern culture places on 
means-ends rational conduct (Weber, 1989). This process of rationalization constricts 
the individual by excluding from legitimate behavior that which is value rational, non-
rational, or irrational. For Weber this is a tragedy only escapable, if at all, through 
ultimate value judgements made by the individual. 
The scholar must adopt a harsh ethic of responsibility and self-control, and divide 
his or her life in just the way modern culture is divided into spheres of existence. One 
can, therefore, only save values by privatizing them, and making value judgements 
matters of personal choice (Lassman and Velody, 1989). One can, in keeping with 
the thesis of value relevance, take certain values as given without endorsing them, 
for research purposes. But value judgements, as terms of approval, disapproval and 
appraisal, must be kept private and outside the sphere of professional work. This 
was Weber's response to the political and moral controversies surrounding the Verein 
fur Sozialpolitik (Proctor,1987), which are most clearly worked out in his two great 
lectures, "Science as a Vocation" and "Politics as a Vocation" (Gerth and Mills, 1946; 
70 
and Lassman and Velody, 1989). 
Science, because it is limited, can only give us empirical knowledge and con­
versely, value judgements can never be proven or disproven because they lie outside 
the realm of science, even though (contrary to Kant) science is ethically relevant to 
responsible individuals who recognize the need to consider the consequences of their 
private judgements and values/ideals in the modern world of the iron cage. 
Weber's (1949) main objection to value judgements came about because of his 
objection to some teachers of his day posing their political opinions as scientific 
facts. In his essay," The Meaning of "Ethical Neutrality" in Sociology and Eco­
nomics", Weber (1949:1) states that the problem of value freedom in science is not 
equivalent to, "whether in teaching one should declare one's acceptance of practical 
value-judgements. . . ". Thus, whether or not science is value free is not the same 
issue as whether a teacher has the right to disguise value judgements as scientific 
fact. 
However adamant Weber (1949) was that the professor has no right to impose 
value judgements on students in the lecture hall, he feels that this is a value judgement 
and is distinct from the question of value judgements in the social sciences. His 
reasoning, in making this distinction, is made clear with the second concept "value 
relevance". This philosophical interpretation determines the selection of problems for 
empirical analysis (Weber, 1949). As Weber (1977:36-37) put it, 
In the empirical social sciences . . . the possibility of meaningful knowl­
edge of what is essential for us in the infinite richness of events is bound 
up with the unremitting application of viewpoints of a specifically pairtic-
ularized character, which, in the last analysis, are oriented on the basis 
of evaluative ideas. These evaluative ideas are for their part empirically 
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discoverable and analyzable as elements of meaningful human conduct, 
but their validity cannot be deduced from empirical data as such. The 
"objectivity" of the social sciences depends rather on the fact that the 
empirical data are always related to those evaluative ideas which alone 
make them worth knowing and the significance of the empirical data is 
derived from these evaluative ideas. 
The value a thing holds for society is what makes it of interest to science. Yet 
we must not deceive ourselves that science uncovers "objective" truth, for the "facts 
themselves" are only available to science if they fit into the value relevant schema 
of the scientist. "Truth", therefore, is only true from a particular viewpoint. Weber 
(1977:31-32) adds that 
All knowledge of cultural reality. . . is knowledge from particular points 
of view. ... If the notion that those standpoints can be derived from the 
"facts themselves" continually recurs, it is due to the naive self-deception 
of the specialist who is unaware that it is due to the evaluative ideas 
with which he unconsciously approaches his subject matter, that he has 
selected from an absolute infinity a tiny portion with the study of which 
he concerns himself. 
Weber saw science as a value-laden enterprise precisely because it is bound up in 
culture. It was Weber's (1977:36-37) position that the contribution of a social science 
lay in exposing these value orientations, adding that, 
The "objectivity" of the social sciences depends rather on the fact that 
the empirical data are always related to those evaluative ideas which alone 
make them worth knowing and the significance of the empirical data is 
derived from these evaluative ideas. 
It is clear from his writings that Weber does not assume value freedom is invested 
either in the university or in science, therefore, the use of "value freedom" as a 
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justification for ignoring the values embedded in the scientific enterprise makes a 
mockery of the true nature of the concept of "value freedom". Weber's intention was 
for science to make explicate its value orientation thereby freeing itself to scrutinize 
those values. The current usage of the concept of "value freedom" used as an ideology 
merely obscures value orientations. 
The dangers of such an ideology of value freedom can be seen in university 
research. With a few exceptions, research in today's university tends to be carried 
out only because someone, somewhere, has both a vested interest in the outcome and 
the means to pay for it, and rarely are the value assumptions of the buyer or the 
researcher scrutinized. Research without a buyer must be conducted in a scholar's 
spare-time and without financial support. This situation sets up a dichotomy between 
research conducted for vested interests and research conducted purely for the purpose 
of discovery and extension of knowledge, which is often discussed in the academic 
debate over "applied" verses "basic" research. 
"Applied" research is often that research which someone is willing to pay for, 
and "basic" research is that for which no immediate market use has been found. 
The result of this problem is that the myth of value freedom allows the scholar to 
ignore the extent to which the university has been transformed into a profit-seeking 
rather than a knowledge-seeking institution. Scholars can pretend to be pursuing 
knowledge in their fields irrespective of the use to which others put this knowledge. 
This ideology creates an epidemic of value blindness. 
Many researchers at land-grant institutions are currently working on problems 
surrounding biotechnology areas such as gene splicing, transgenis and the expression 
of specific traits in a plant. In many cases the researchers argue that they are doing 
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very basic science, often at the cutting edge of high technology questions. However, 
this represents an act of self-deception, for without corporate/governmental/ foun­
dation funding it is unlikely that scientists would be attempting to create herbicide 
resistant food crops, cows who produce more milk, or beef that is palatable to the 
Japanese. Indeed, as many observers (Blumenthal et. al., 1986a,b) have noted, this 
profit-driven activity has come to be the "tail that wags the dog," as research money 
from external sources has come to be increasingly central to the budgets of large 
research universities. 
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6. VALUE FREEDOM OR VALUE BLINDNESS? 
The world view of rational science carries with it the assumption that science is 
value free. Simply put, this means that the methods of science and the training of the 
scientist remove from science all value judgements. Scientists, this view holds, should 
not concern themselves with values because the rational methods of science and the 
objective eye of the scientist will surely ensure the exclusion of value judgements. 
Yet, the choosing of a subject to study and the categories used to study it are always 
value laden steps. Science must be understood to constitute merely one point of view 
among many, for as Weber (1977:36) pointed out there is a : 
. . . hair-line which separates science from faith . . . The objective 
validity of all empirical knowledge rests exclusively upon the ordering of 
the given reality according to categories which are subjective in a specific 
sense, namely, in that they present the presuppositions of our knowledge 
and are based on the presupposition of the value of those truths which 
empirical knowledge alone is able to give us. The means available to our 
science offer nothing to those persons to whom this truth is of no value. 
It should be remembered that the belief in the value of scientific truth 
is the product of certain cultures and is not a product of man's original 
nature. 
Scientists should never overlook the values embedded in scientific work, for sci­
ence is an agreed-upon means of viewing our world, nothing more. While it should be 
a concern of all scientists, those doing research "for hire" must especially understand 
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that they cannot assume the "facts" they find are untainted simply because they 
adhere to the strictures of the scientific method. 
Ignoring the values embedded in their work permits scholars to safely overlook 
the fact that they may have chosen their research topics based on the availability of 
funding provided by vested interest groups who may control the topic, the extent of 
the research, its duration, the data collected, and the publication and dissemination 
of findings. Scholars in recent years have demonstrated a well-developed ability to 
ignore the difficulty and ethics of reaching findings that are unpleasant to the sponsors 
of research. This may well be due, in part, to the myth of academic freedom in the 
university. 
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7. VALUE FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
It is necessary to separate the concept of "value freedom" &om that of "academic 
freedom". While "value freedom" refers to the supposed absence of values .&om a 
true scientific enterprise, "academic freedom" refers to the freedom of the academic 
to pursue topics free from constraints imposed by institutional or external forces 
(Tight, 1988). In the case of "academic freedom," the institution promises to shield 
the academic from all interference with their work other than that of peer review, 
and thus the academic should be free to pursue and report any line of research so 
long as the quality standards of the discipline are met. In practice this is far from 
the case, for there are many constraints placed on academic research that interfere 
with academic freedom. Some of these constraints are discussed below: 
(1) Funding Issues: First of all, there is the constraint imposed by funding. 
Due to current budget constraints, much university research today must be carried 
out at the largess of an external grantor. The grantor is usually very specific about 
the nature, duration, and use of the research for which they are willing to pay. These 
constraints can often be in conflict with the interests of extending knowledge in the 
academic area. Thus, not only is the topic defined from outside of the discipline, the 
length of the study is predetermined and is often much shorter than most academics 
would prefer. Also, very little follow-up or replication research is funded. Reporting of 
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the findings for academic purposes should be detailed and timely, two characteristics 
that may not promote the interests of the grantor. The grantor may ask that the 
findings of research commissioned to create a competitive edge for the grantor be 
suppressed or only partially reported. If the findings of the research are unfavorable 
to the grantor, they may refuse to allow the publication of the findings. 
(2) Applied/Basic: A second constraint on academic freedom is self-imposed 
and relates to value relevance. Most academic disciplines in the university succumb 
to some form of the "applied" verses "basic" debate, where "applied" research is often 
granted the higher status because it brings more money into the university. It is seen 
as better for a scientist's career to do "applied" research than to be engaged in the 
more esoteric "basic" research, and graduate students are encouraged to pursue more 
"applied" aspects of their fields of study. In sociology, this phenomenon manifests 
itself in the proliferation of statistic and methodology courses in graduate curricula 
and the disappearance of theory courses. 
Academics, therefore, end up spending a considerable amount of their time seek­
ing clients and "real" problems rather than purely trying to extend the frontiers 
of knowledge. Thus, a considerable portion of available research topics have been 
excluded from the perception of scholars. 
The plight of the scholar parallels the lot of modern humanity as described by 
Weber, for while the Puritan wanted to work in a calling, we are forced to do so. 
Since the turn of the century, many reformist minded scholars sought to apply their 
knowledge to concrete problems and served as consultants to business and govern­
ment. Yet this desire on the part of some has become an iron cage that imprisons us 
all. 
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The over abundance of research done for clients having narrow, utilitarian inter­
ests is not, in and of itself, an evil, but it does point to a disproportionate allocation 
of resources to these parts of the university which generate profits in the form of 
research funding. What this does, most importantly, is to transform the university 
from its commonly understood role in knowledge production and distribution. 
The university as an institution, which appeared in Western societies in the Mid­
dle Ages, was classically defined as an entity apart from the mainstream of commerce 
and politics. In this role the university has served scientifically oriented societies as 
an honest broker of information and an unbiased tester of products and ideas. For ex­
ample, during the early part of this century, American land-grant universities began 
to objectively test products such as farm equipment, (at the University of Nebraska) 
and many others. 
These university trials were seen as a cold, objective tests by uninvolved sci­
entists. This role is at risk because modern universities are rapidly becoming not 
materially different from for-profit corporate research-and- development companies. 
In many situations today, researchers at universities operate as if they are employ­
ees of for-profit corporations, in that their research topics, methods, materials and 
approaches may be dictated by the purchaser of the services. 
In further violation of the traditional free flow of information, these research 
contracts may specify that results or products of the research become the property 
of the funding agency. Findings must often be vetted through funders before they 
can be published. In light of these kinds of developments, some have raised troubling 
issues for universities, such as whether universities should retain a tax exemption 
when it is little more than a publicly supported private enterprise. 
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These unsettling facts are obscured by the ideology of "value freedom". Behind . 
this veil of mythological value freedom hides the truth that American academics sell 
knowledge production to the highest bidder. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
Defining rationality in a purely means-ends context allows science to pretend to 
be able to prescribe what course society ought take. This places science in the role 
of social prophet. Science in turn must take on the mantel of value freedom so that 
it will not appear to be directed by specific interests. Science must also invent the 
myth of academic freedom in order that scholars may remain blissfully blind to the 
interests inherent in their research. What these papers strive to show is that Weber 
clearly understood these difficulties and that he prescribed a remedy. Values and 
value orientations should be central to the study of society. One cannot proclaim 
that one value orientation is superior to another through science, but science can 
explore how values influence behavior. Such study of values would be beneficial not 
only to science in exposing the values inherent to it, but also to society in making 
clear the values underlying policy decisions. 
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